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More than three decades after the last civil-military dictatorship (1973-1985) ended, Uruguay is
finally taking steps to replace its long-questioned intelligence apparatus with a system that would be
under civilian control and the result, from the outset, of a broad political consensus.
Information gathering, special operations, counterintelligence, secret agents, creating false identity
documents to protect the identities of those agents, classified and top-secret information, and strong
parliamentary oversight are some of the principal contents of a bill introduced Jan. 6 to create a
new Sistema Nacional de Inteligencia del Estado (National System of State Intelligence, SNIE). The
president’s office expects Congress to approve the legislation in the early part of this year.
Consensus to move forward with the project coalesced quickly after the weekly Brecha denounced
the military for continuing—just as it did during the bloody dictatorship years—to spy on political
parties, labor and civil society groups, and judges and journalists it deems “enemies” and
“subversives.”
The claims, made last year by journalist Samuel Blixen, prompted a visit to Uruguay by Edison
Lanza, the special rapporteur for freedom of expression for the Organization of American States
(OAS). In an interview with Brecha, the OAS representative expressed concern about “this
discovery, which proves the existence of illegal activity and acts of intimidation that constitute a
clear violation of personal integrity and privacy, and of freedom of expression as well.”
Lanza noted that there have been similar cases elsewhere in South America, including in Colombia,
between 2002 and 2010, when intelligences services interfered with the country’s democratic
processes. He also said that for countries like Colombia and Peru, which are democratic but have
had authoritarian governments, complaints made to the Office of the Special Rapporteur for
Freedom of Expression, a branch of the OAS’s Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, have
been a constant.
“It’s time for Uruguay to have a serious discussion about placing these kinds of activities under
parliamentary control,” Lanza advised.

Congressional oversight
The bill before Congress looks to regulate the intelligence work carried out by different state
agencies. It establishes, in its opening article, that such activities “be done in strict adherence to
the principles of a republican democratic governmental regime and with full respect for human
rights.” It also touches on issues that the Uruguayan legal code had never addressed. The legislation
would empower intelligence staff, for example, “to infiltrate certain areas as hidden agents,” use
false documents to protect their real identities, and collaborate with outside informers.
It contains a section on counterintelligence as well, defining it as “an intelligence activity whose
goal is to detect, localize and neutralize actions being taken by other nations or by people or
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organizations that can affect the interests of the [Uruguayan] state.” With regards to intelligence
sources, the bill distinguishes between two types: so-called “open sources” and “closed sources.”
The website www.academia.edu, a research clearing house, defines “open sources” as things that
offer only “freely available” and “non-classified information” such as radio and television news
broadcasts, airline passenger manifests, and the names of public service users, bank clients or
credit card holders. “Closed sources” are those with “counterintelligence measures in place to
block access or knowledge of.” Such sources are difficult and costly to penetrate, especially at times
of conventional war “given the logical increase in counterintelligence work and the fact that they
contain classified information,” the website explained.
The legislation strictly establishes that SNIE personnel of all levels “be barred from carrying out
repressive activities or taking on for themselves police or criminal investigation functions.” The
law would also prohibit agents from “interfering with the country’s political, social or economic
activities, foreign policy, or political parties.” Last but not least, the new rules call for strong
civilian oversight of the SNIE—just as Lanza’s Office of the Special Rapporteur advises in all of
the countries with which it consults. Internally, the intelligence body would have its own chain
of command. External control, however, would be handled by Congress via a bicameral and
permanent supervisory committee. To guarantee transparency, the committee would include
delegates from all of the political parties represented in the legislature.

Eavesdropping software
The concerns Lanza raised in his interview with Brecha had previously been expressed in a press
release that the Office of the Special Rapporteur issued on July 21, 2015. At the time, the OAS body
said it was puzzled by widespread revelations proving that various Latin American governments
had “purchased and implemented surveillance programs that could cause serious harm to the rights
to privacy and freedom of thought and expression.” The press release noted that, 400 gigabytes
of information had been exposed around that time from an Italian firm called Hacking Team,
which sells special spying software, commonly known as “Da Vinci” or “Galileo” programs, to
governments and government agencies.
The document went on to say that the surveillance software offered by Hacking Team is designed
to bypass computer and mobile phone encryption, allowing users to access messages, telephone
calls, e-mails, and chat communication. “This software can also remotely activate microphones
and cameras,” the Office of the Special Rapporteur explained. The press release then quoted the
Hacking Team website to show that “[e]vidence collection on monitored devices is stealth, and
transmission of collected data from the device to the RCS server is encrypted and untraceable.”
Without mentioning names, the Office of the Special Rapporteur suggested that certain countries in
the region, based on press reports and claims by civil society organizations, “are or used to be clients
of Hacking Team and are using their software [as of July 2015] without the legal authority to do so.”
In response to such revelations, some countries denied having anything to do with Hacking Team.
“Others stated that they bought the software supported by law for the prevention and investigation
of organized crime and terrorism,” the press release explained.
“On this disclosure, and facing possible impacts derived from the usage of this type of privacyinvading technologies and the right to exercise freedom of expression without illegal interferences,
the Office of the Special Rapporteur would like to recall that according to international standards,
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the use of programs or systems for the surveillance of private communications should be clearly and
precisely established by law,” the document went on to say.

Revamping and renaming
In recent years, following the end of bloody dictatorships, as in Chile and Argentina, or far-right
authoritarian governments, like the ones in Peru under Alberto Fujimori (1990-2000) and Colombia
under Álvaro Uribe (2002-2010), various Latin American countries shut down their old intelligence
services (NotiSur, April 3, 2015). “They were designed for the Cold War era and based on the model
of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in the US,” Brazilian sociologist Emir Sader wrote in an
article published Jan. 4 on the website Carta Maior.
Chile’s notorious Dirección de Inteligencia Nacional (National Intelligence Directorate, DINA), for
example, in 2004 went on to become the Agencia Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence
Agency, ANI) (NotiSur, June 3, 2005). In Argentina, the Secretaría de Inteligencia del Estado
(State Intelligence Secretariat, SIDE), in 2015 became the Agencia Federal de Inteligencia (Federal
Intelligence Agency, AFI).
In Peru, following a period during which it had been shuttered, the Dirección Nacional de
Inteligencia (National Intelligence Directorate, DNI) was cautiously reorganized, and in September,
President Pedro Pablo Kuczynski appointed a businessman with no security or intelligence
experience to head it. In Colombia, the government closed down the Departamento Administrativo
de Seguridad (Administrative Security Department, DAS), replacing it in November 2011 with the
Dirección Nacional de Inteligencia (National Intelligence Directorate, DNI).
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